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( 
DESIGNATION OF PARTIES 
Pursuant to Rule 24(d), Utah Rules Of Appellate Procedure, appellant J. Pochynok 
Co. will be referred to herein as "Pochynok" and the appellees Gregory and LouAnn 
Smedsrud will be referred to herein as the "Smedsruds". 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)G). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
(Including standards of appellate review and supporting authority.) 
ISSUE ON APPEAL: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT HAD 
ENOUGH INFORMATION TO PROPERLY DETERMINE THE 
"SUCCESSFUL PARTY" IN THIS CASE FOR PURPOSES OF 
AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES BASED UPON THE JURY VERDICT 
THAT WAS RENDERED IN THIS MATTER? 
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review: When a trial court's rulings are based 
upon a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law, where a correct one would have 
produced a different result, the party adversely affected is entitled to have the error 
rectified in a proper adjudication under a correct principal of law. Reed v. Avery, 616 
P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980); Farris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979) and Cummings v. 
Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 Pac. 519 (1912). Wliether and the extent to which attorney 
fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. 
Selvage v. J.J Johnson & Assocs., 910 P.2d 1252 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996). 
Presentation of Issue: The above stated issue was preserved for appeal by the 
following: Defendants' Motion To Tax Costs And Attorney Fees (R. 387-389); 
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Memorandum Of Law In Support Of Defendants' Motion To Tax Costs And Attorneys' 
Fees (R. 435-459); Plaintiffs Motion For Award Of Attorney's Fees And Costs (R. 469-
470); Plaintiffs Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiff s Motion For Award Of Attorney's 
Fees And Costs And In Opposition To Defendant's Motion To Tax Costs And Attorney's 
Fees (R. 572-592); Reply Memorandum In Support Of Defendants' Motion To Tax Costs 
And Attorneys Fees (R. 544-554); Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion For 
Award Of Attorneys' Fees And Costs (R. 567-571); Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum In 
Support Of Plaintiff s Motion For Award Of Attorney's Fees And Costs (R. 598-609); 
Minute Entry Ruling (R. 621-622); Judgment Upon Verdict And Order On Post Trial 
Motions (R. 635-640); Plaintiffs Rule 59(e) Motion To Amend Judgment (R. 650-651); 
Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiff s Rule 59(e) Motion To Amend Judgment (R. 652-
666); Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs Rule 59(e) Motion To Amend Judgment 
(R. 667-686); Reply Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiffs Rule 59(e) Motion To 
Amend Judgment (R. 706-718); Minute Entry Ruling (R. 726-727); Order Denying 
Motion To Amend Judgment (R. 729-731); Appellant's briefing in the Utah Court Of 
Appeals (Case No. 20020940-CA); Appellant's briefing in the Utah Supreme Court (Case 
No. 20040005-SC); Remittitur From Utah Supreme Court (R. 892-903); Remittitur -
Order On Remand (R. 904-905); Pochynok's Request For New Jury Trial And 
Submission Of Form Of Special Verdict To Jury (R. 954-973); Pochynok's Submission 
Of Proposed Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law (R. 974-975); and Smedsmds' 
Findings Of fact And Conclusions Of Law Re: Costs And Attorneys Fees (R. 984-992). 
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ISSUE ON APPEAL: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
WHEN IT FAILED TO SET ASIDE THE GARNISHMENT OF 
* POCHYNOK'S ACCOUNT AND FAILED TO RESINSTATE 
POCHYNOK'S MECHANIC'S LIEN? 
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review: When a trial court's rulings are based 
upon a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law, where a correct one would have 
produced a different result, the party adversely affected is entitled to have the error 
rectified in a proper adjudication under a correct principal of law. Reed v. Avery, 616 
P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980); Farris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979) and Cummings v. 
Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 Pac. 519 (1912). 
Preservation of Issue: The above-stated issue was preserved for appeal by the 
following: Pochynok's Motion To Set Aside Garnishment, For Restitution, And To 
Reinstate Mechanic's Lien (R. 908-912); Memorandum In Support Of Pochynok's 
Motion To Set Aside Garnishment, For Restitution, And To Reinstate Mechanic's Lien 
(R. 908-912); Memorandum In Opposition To Pochynok's Motion To Set Aside 
Garnishment For Restitution And To Reinstate Mechanic's Lien (R. 913-936); Reply 
Memorandum In support Of Pochynok's Motion To Set Aside Garnishment, for 
Restitution, And To Reinstate Mechanic's Lien; Minute Entry Ruling (R. 944-945); 
Minute Entry (R. 946-949); and Minutes Law And Motion (R. 950). 
STATUTES WHICH ARE OF DETERMINATIVE AND OF CENTRAL 
IMPORTANCE ON THE APPEAL 
Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-18. Attorneys1 fees — Offer of judgment 
(1) Except as provided in Section 38-11-107 and in Subsection (2), in any action 
brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to 
recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs 
in the action. 
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(2) A person who files a wrongful lien as provided in Section 38-1-25 is not 
entitled to recover attorneys' fees under Subsection (1). 
(3) A party against whom any action is brought to enforce a lien under this chapter 
may make an offer of judgment pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
If the offer is not accepted and the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more 
favorable than the offer, the offeree shall pay the costs and attorneys' fees incurred by the 
offeror after the offer was made. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course Of Proceedings, And Disposition Below 
Pochynok, a general contractor, brought suit against the Smedsruds seeking to 
recover damages for breach of a construction contract and to foreclose its mechanic's 
lien. The Smedsruds asserted a counterclaim also seeking damages for breach of the 
construction contract. At trial, the jury found in favor of Pochynok awarding $7,076.56. 
There was no award entered on the jury verdict form in favor of the Smedsruds. 
Pochynok and the Smedsruds each filed post trial motions asserting that they were 
the successful party at trial and sought costs and attorneys fees pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 31-1-18. The Smedsruds argued that they were entitled to their attorney fees 
because they were the "successful party" in the litigation in accordance with § 38-1-
18(1). Contrary to the Smedsruds position, Pochynok argued that as the only party to be 
awarded by the jury, Pochynok was in fact the "successful party" in the litigation, and 
therefore entitled to its attorney fees under § 31-1-18(1). The trial court raled that the 
Smedsruds were the prevailing party and therefore entitled to recover all of their costs 
and attorney fees. The Smedsruds subsequently garnished $37,585.00 from Pochynok 
Company's bank account. Despite Pochynok's objections, the trial court upheld the 
garnishment. 
A 
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This case was then appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals in 2002. Pochynok v. 
Smedsrud, 80 P.3d 563, 486 Utah Adv. Rep 27, 2003 UT App 375 (Ut. Ct. App. 2003). 
On appeal, Pochynok argued that it was entitled to costs and fees incurred in the action 
because it was the only party that received an award from the jury. Pochynok also 
contested the appropriateness of the garnishment. The Smedsruds argued that the trial 
court should have evaluated the successful party determination using a "flexible and 
reasoned" approach and further contended that the garnishment was appropriate. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's rulings in all respects. 
Pochynok thereafter petitioned to the Utah Supreme Court for a Writ Of 
Certiorari. The Utah Supreme Court granted the petition and heard the case. Pochynok v. 
Smedsrud, 116 P.3d 353, 528 Utah Adv. Rep 34, 2005 UT 39 (Utah 2004). The Utah 
Supreme Court expressed approval for the use of the "flexible and reasoned" approach, 
but reversed the Court of Appeals decision and directed the appellate court "to remand to 
the trial court for a factual determination of awards and offsets, followed by a ruling on 
who is the successful party under Utah Code section 38-1-18(1) and whether an award of 
attorneys fees under Utah Code section 38-1-18(3) is proper." Upon remand the attorney 
fees award was vacated pending the trial court's determination. 
After remand and the setting aside of the attorney fees award, Pochynok sought to 
have the money that had been fomierly garnished from its account returned. Pochynok 
farther requested that the trial court reinstate its mechanic's lien. These issues were 
briefed and submitted to the trial court. Following oral argument the trial court declined 
to reinstate the mechanic's lien and took the garnishment issue under advisement. The 
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ti ial 1:1 ten directed tl le pai ties to si ibi i lit. pi oposed Hi id.iii.gs: a.i id coiiicJusion in .1 elatioi 1 to 
the attorney fees issue. 
Pochynok thereafter filed a motion for new trial along with its proposed findings 
and conclusioi is. Both tl le n lotioi 1 f 01 i ie w I:i ial ai id pi ( iposed findii lgs and conch isions 
averred that a new trial was warranted because the trial court did not have the information 
necessary from the jury to utilize the Utah Supreme Court, mandated flexible and 
reasoned approach. 
The Smedsi uds filed tliei..! proposed findings and conch isions a few days latei Oi 1 
the same day the Sinedsruds proposed finding and conclusions were filed, the trial court 
issued a minuie entry uhich adopted the Smedsruds' proposal as the findings and 
t .nciUMo-i • f • ..." * !-••• '-•isicd.-iLK'.s propox-; wuo]::^ . : -... .:- ••;• 
determined that the Smedsruds were the successful party in the iiiigauoii ana were 
therefore entitled to all of (heir costs and fees. Pochynok appealed from the trial court's 
signed minute entry. 
:S * IT.MF^ V « x\ - ^ I N 
1. m this action, Pochynok brought a bleach of construction contract claim 
against the Smedsruds and sought to foreclose a mechanic's lien on real property owned 
substantial damages for breach of the same construction contract, winch damages 
included unearned supervisor fees, workmanship defects and delay damages. (R 19-29; 
I 'lie in.x liter was presented to \ t jury on IVk \:y 21 i ind 22, 2002 (R 249-250) 
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3. At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury returned a verdict in favor of 
Pochynok Company in the amount of $7,076.56. (R. 354-355) The "general" jury verdict 
form read as follows: 
1. Based on the law as it has been explained to us, we find in favor 
of plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc., and against defendants Gregory 
and LouAnn Smedsrud, in the amount of $7,076.56. 
2. Based on the law as it has been explained to us, we find in favor 
of defendants Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud, and against plaintiffs J. 
Pochynok Company, Inc., in the amount of $ . 
4. Pochynok and the Smedsruds each filed post-trial motions requesting 
attorneys fees on the basis that each respective party was the "successful party" in the 
lien foreclosure action pursuant to § 3 8-1 -18 (1). 
5. Notwithstanding the fact that jury returned a verdict in favor of Pochynok 
and against the Smedsruds, the trial court ruled in favor of the Smedsruds, finding that 
the Smedsruds were the successful party and therefore entitled to recover their costs and 
fees. (R. 621-622 and 726-727) 
6. Judgment was entered in favor of the Smedsruds on August 13, 2002. (R. 
635-640) 
7. On September 12, 2002, funds in a Pochynok Company bank account were 
garnished by the Smedsruds in the amount of $37,585.00, and the garnishment was 
upheld by the trial court over Pochynok's objection. (R. 703-705, 728 and 849-851) 
8. Pochynok Company sought appellate review of the trial court's 
determination that the Smedsruds were the successful party in the litigation. (R. 816-
817) 
7 
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9. In affirming the trial court's successful party determination, the Utah Court 
of Appeals stated as follows: 
Here, the jury's verdict form does not provide precise calculations of 
offsets the jury may have made for the Smedsruds' counterclaims for faulty 
workmanship, delay damages, and improper supervision. However, from 
the verdict, the trial court could have reasonable inferred such offsets by 
simply subtracting the jury's verdict of $7,076.56 from the $81,269.91 that 
Pochynok sought to recover in the lien enforcement action. The trial court 
could have reasonably concluded that the jury in fact found in favor of the 
Smedsruds on their counterclaims and offset these damages in the amount 
of $74,193.35 from Pochynok's initial claim, (emphasis added) 
10. After receiving the Court of Appeals' decision, Pochynok filed a Petition 
For Writ Of Certiorari with the Utah Supreme Court. 
11. The Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Court of Appeals 
decision and directed the appellate court "to remand to the trial court for a factual 
determination of awards and offsets, followed by a ruling on who is the successful party 
under Utah Code section 38-1-18(1) and whether an award of attorneys fees under Utah 
Code section 38-1-18(3) is proper." 
12. Based upon the Utah Supreme Court's decision, the attorney fees award in 
this case was vacated until the trial court made a determination of awards and offsets. 
13. After the case returned to the trial court, Pochynok filed a motion to have 
the garnished money returned and for reinstatement of it's mechanic's lien. (R. 906-940) 
14. The trial court denied reinstatement of the mechanic's lien, and took the 
garnishment issue under advisement. The trial court also directed that the parties file 
proposed findings and conclusions in relation to the successful party/attorney fees issue. 
(R. 946-950) 
8 
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15. Pochynok then filed a request for a new trial, along with its proposed 
findings and conclusions. (R. 951-977) 
16. A short time thereafter, the Smedsmds filed their proposed findings and 
conclusions. On the same day as their filing, the trial court entered the proposed findings 
and conclusions as the trial court's findings and conclusions. 
17. Pochynok thereafter appealed the signed minute entry order in which the 
trial court adopted the Smedruds' proposed findings and conclusions as it own. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court in this case did not have enough information from the jury to 
determine the successful party at trial for purposes of awarding costs and attorney fees. 
The trial court engaged in impermissible speculation in order to reach its findings and 
conclusions. As such, a new trial should be granted so a proper award of costs and 
attorney fees can be determined. 
The trial court erred when it failed to return the proceeds which had been 
garnished from Pochynok's account, and further erred when if failed to reinstate 
Pochynok's mechanic's lien. After the Utah Supreme Court vacated the attorney fees 
award in this case, there was no valid legal basis for the Smedsmds to retain the 
garnished money. f 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE 1 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT HAD ENOUGH INFORMATION TO PROPERLY 
DETERMINE THE "SUCCESSFUL PARTY" IN THIS CASE FOR PURPOSES OF 
o 
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AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES BASED UPON THE JURY VERDICT THAT WAS 
RENDERED IN THIS MATTER? 
The trial court in this matter did not have enough information from the jury to 
utilize the flexible and reasoned approach mandated by the Utah Supreme Court. The 
jury verdict form completed by the jury only provided for an award in favor of Pochynok 
and not for any award in favor of Smedsrud. The jury's May 22, 2002 Jury Verdict 
stated as follows: 
1. Based on the law as it has been explained to us, we find in favor of 
plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc., and against defendants Gregory and 
LouAnn Smedsrud, in the amount of $7,076.56. 
2. Based on the law as it has been explained to us, we find in favor of 
defendants Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud, and against plaintiffs J. 
Pochynok Company, Inc., in the amount of $ . 
The jury thus found Pochynok entitled to recover $7,076.56 from the Smedsmds. No 
amount was inserted in the blank providing for any award in favor of the Smedsmds. 
Following trial, Pochynok and the Smedsmds each claimed attorney fees under 
Section 38-1-18 of Utah mechanic's lien law. Subsection (1) of Section 38-1-18 provides 
"the successful party" shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees. 
Notwithstanding that the jury awarded $7,076.56 to Pochynok, and made no express 
award to the Smedsmds, the trial court ruled the Smedsmds the successful party for 
pmposes of awarding attorney fees and did in fact award the Smedsmds' costs and 
attorneys fees against Pochynok in the amount of $84,036.54. 
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals found the trial court properly determined the 
Smedsmds were the successful party, and noted the jury's verdict did not show whatever 
offsets the jury might have applied as to the Smedsmds' counterclaims. The appellate 
m 
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court then stated the trial court could have inferred that the jury awarded the Smedsruds 
$74,193.35 in offsets and on that basis may have concluded the Smedsruds were the 
successful party. 
The June 24, 2005 decision of the Utah Supreme Court reversed the decision of 
the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court's decision notes that Pochynok filed a 
mechanic's lien for approximately $74,000.00 and that Pochynok had asserted a claim at 
trial for $81,269.91 not including costs or attorneys fees. The Supreme Court further 
noted that the Smedsruds claimed an unspecified amount of offsets and damages, 
claiming unearned supervisor fees, work defects and delays. 
The Supreme Court's decision stated that the jury awarded Pochynok a verdict of 
$7,076.56 giving no indication of whether or by how much the jury may have offset the 
claims made by the Smedsruds against any larger Pochynok entitlement which might 
have entered into the juiy's deliberations. 
The Supreme Court held that the trial court should have first determined who was 
the "successful party" under subsection (1) of Section 38-1-18. The Supreme Court 
decision cites A.K. & R. Wliipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 94 P.3d 270 
(Utah 2004), a mechanic's lien case in which counterclaims were made although one 
party received a small recovery. Whipple held the trial court properly determined there 
was no "successful party", only essentially a draw and was justified in not awarding 
attorney fees. The Supreme Court stated that the Whipple decision means that rigid 
application of the net judgment rale could result in unreasonable awards of attorneys fees 
and deprive a trial court of power to apply discretion and common sense and said that the 
11 
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"flexible and reasoned approach" outlined in Whipple and in Mountain States 
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551 (Utah Ct.App. 1989) "requires more 
information about the jury award for the parties' particular claims than is available in this 
case." 
The Supreme Court further said that "because the jury's verdict did not indicate 
specific awards and offsets, the trial court did not have the infomiation necessary to 
undertake such a balancing" (of amounts sought vs. what was recovered) and in its final 
conclusion said that "we conclude that the trial court could not have made this (successful 
party) determination without specific infomiation regarding the total amount the jury 
awarded to Pochynok and the total amount in offsets it awarded to the Smedsruds." 
The aforementioned statement presumes, without support from the record, that the 
jury made entitlement findings for both sides and then offset them to amve at a net award 
in favor of Pochynok although the Supreme Court said the jury "did not provide this 
infomiation in its verdict form." 
The Supreme Court's decision states that the trial court should have made findings 
regarding "the amount sought and won by each party". However, the trial court was not 
in a position to do that for the very reasons stated several times in the Supreme Court 
opinion. The jury properly conducted its deliberations outside the presence of the trial 
court leaving no earmarked trail as to how it came to the award made to Pochynok. 
The jury may have determined that Pochynok proved only part of Pochynok's 
claims. The jury may have determined the Smedsruds did not prove any of the 
Smedsruds' counterclaims. The jury may have determined the Smedsruds proved part, 
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\ 
but not all of their counterclaims and offset them against amounts it determined were 
owed Pochynok. 
The jury's single entry on the jury verdict form leaves the parties, their counsel, 
the trial court, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court to speculate and guess as to 
whether and to what extent the jury may or may not have determined the Smedsruds were 
entitled to offsets against a larger amount the jury determined was earned by Pochynok or 
whether and the extent to which the jury decided the evidence was insufficient to support 
certain claims. 
A "flexible and reasoned" approach to the fee entitlement issue cannot arise from 
speculation/supposition concerning the jury's verdict. The Supreme Court's opinion 
specifically rejects the "reasoned" suppositions made by the Court of Appeals concerning 
suppositions previously made by the trial court, emphasizing that it cannot be determined 
from the jury's verdict by what means the jury arrived at its result. The opinion of the 
Supreme Court did not and could not help the trial court speculate as to how the jury may 
or may not have proceeded in arriving at its award to Pochynok. There has been no 
waiver of the right to jury trial as to foundational factual issues in favor of speculative 
court findings of fact and conclusions of law made on a cold record three years after the 
trial as to the meaning of a simple jury verdict. 
While the opinion of the Supreme Court does not specifically direct a retrial, it 
also does not and could not properly purport to deny the party's right to a jury trial on 
factual issues the opinion states are dispositive of the attorney fee entitlement issue. 
11 
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The Supreme Court's opinion repeatedly emphasizes the fact that the trial court 
could not make a determination of entitlement to attorney fees without additional 
information. The Supreme Court's opinion repeatedly states such information is simply 
not available from the jury verdict. There is simply no source from which such 
information can be derived other than from pure speculation. The trial court, therefore, 
could not properly determine entitlement to attorney fees on the basis of its speculation 
concerning the means by which a jury may have anived at the verdict in favor of 
Pochynok. 
If the jury had inserted a total entitlement figure in the Pochynok award and a total 
entitlement figure in the blank provided for a Smedsrud award, would there be a starting 
point for application of the "flexible and reasoned" and "balancing (claims and 
recoveries) proportionally approach" directed by the Supreme Court? 
No. Such figures would not alone suffice because as the Supreme Court's opinion 
points out "the jury verdict does not specify who won what". Further, as stated by the 
Supreme Court opinion: 
It "gave no indication of whether, or by how much, the jury offset 
the Smedsrud claim against Pochynok's claim". "[I]t is clear that the 
nature of the flexible and reasoned approach outlined in Mountain States 
and Wlripple requires more information about the jury award for the 
parties' particular claims than is available in this case". "Such an analysis 
in this case is impossible without more specific monetary figures". 
"[Bjecause the jury's verdict did not indicate specific awards and offsets 
the trial court did not have the information necessary to undertake such a 
balancing". "[T]his insufficiency of information requires that we direct the 
court of appeals to remand this case to the trial court for a determination of 
awards and offsets..." (emphasis added) 
1 A 
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( 
The final paragraph of the June 24, 2005 opinion of the Utah Supreme Court 
directs the Court of Appeals "to remand to the trial court for a factual determination of 
awards and offsets, followed by a ruling on who is the successful party under Utah Code 
section 38-1-18(1) and whether an award of attorneys fees under Utah Code section 38-1-
18(3) is proper." 
To obtain the necessary information which the existing jury's verdict does not 
supply, a new jury trial must be granted. A properly drafted special verdict form with 
appropriate specific interrogatories must be submitted to the jury. Only in that way will a 
factual basis exist for determining an award of attorney fees. 
While counsel for the appellant could find little Utah case law which evaluates 
facts similar to the case at hand, other jurisdictions have examined these issues. In 
Kansas City Power & Light Companyv. Bibb & Assoiciates, Inc., S.W.3d , 2006 
WL 1222691 (Mo.App. W.D.) the Missouri Court of Appeals stated: 
In construing a verdict, the court determines if it can find a 
reasonable clear intent expressed therein. Thome v. Thome, 350 S.W.2d 
754, 757 (Mo.1961), overruled on other grounds by Douglass Safire, 712 
S.W.2d 373 (Mo. banc 1986); Robinson v. Riverside Concrete, Inc., 544 
S.W.2d 865, 871 (Mo.App. 1976). The verdict is construed liberally when 
attempting to ascertain the jury's intent. Id.; Lewis v. State, 152 S.W.3d 
325, 328 (Mo.App. W.D.2004) (quoting Morse v. Johnson, 594 S.W.2d 
610, 616 (Mo. banc 1980)). To serve as the basis for the judgment, the 
jury's verdict must be clear, intelligible, consistent, and certain. Robinson, 
544 S.W.2d at 871. It should be responsible to all of the material issues. 
Thome, 350 S.W.2d at 757. The verdict should impart a definite meaning 
free from ambiguity and should show just what the jury intended. 
Robinson, 544 S.W.2d at 871. "[T]he verdict must be clear and 
unambiguous so that a judgment may be written upon it without resorting to 
inference or construction." Lewis, 152 S.W.3d at 328 (quoting Morse, 594 
S.W.2d at 616). The parties are entitled to the unconditional judgment of 
the jury, rather than the court's interpretation of its findings. Robinson, 544 
1 C 
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S.W.2d at 871-872 (quoting Boone v. Richardson, 388 S.W.2d 68, 76 
(Mo.App.1965), overruled on other grounds by Douglass v. Sqfire, 712 
S.W.2d 373 (Mo. banc 1986)). A court may not speculate as to what the 
jury meant; and a verdict that requires speculation to determine its meaning 
cannon stand and cannot support a judgment entered thereon. Id. at 872; 
Trimble v. Pracna, 51 S.W.3d 481, 594 (Mo.App. S.D.2001). 
In this case, the parties, the trial court and the appellate courts can only infer or 
speculate how the jury reached its verdict. Thus, it is impossible from the jury verdict 
form to determine on what claims, if any, the Smedsruds were successful. (As Pochynok 
did in fact receive an award from the jury, it is undisputable it was successful on part of 
its claims, however, the trial court did not take Pochynok's success at trial into account in 
any manner in purportedly balancing the parties' relative successes at trial.) 
Moreover, it is open to question whether and the extent to which the Smedsruds 
were successful in regard to their unearned supervisory, work defect, and delay claims. 
For example, it is possible the jury could have found Pochynok completed work and 
enhanced the value of the Smedsruds' property in the amount of $50,000.00, thereby 
entitling an award of that amount in Pochynok's favor. Additionally, the jury could have 
also found that the Smedsuds incurred "delay" damages in the amount of $42,923.44, 
thereby entitling the Smedruds to an award against Pochynok in that amount. The jury 
could have netted these figures (rather than entering both figures on the jury verdict 
form), and found in favor of Pochynok in the amount of $7,076.56. 
The problem is, even if the record in this case contained the amounts sought by 
both parties on their respective claims, it is impossible to know on what claims, and in 
what amounts, the jury felt the parties were successful. In the above example, the jury 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
could have concluded that Pochynok completed the work in a proper manner and was 
entitled to be paid. The jury could have also concluded that purported delays in 
completing the work caused the Smedsruds' damage. Both parties would therefore be 
entitled to recovery against the other. 
This potential scenario (which based upon the lack of information from the jury is 
as viable as any other scenario) raises an additional important issue. It is doubtful that 
"delay damages" should in any way impact or "offset" the amount successfully asserted 
in a mechanic's lien claim in any event. In Whipple, the Supreme Court stated: 
We emphasize, however, that a court should look only to the parties' 
claims and counterclaims relating directly to the specific mechanic's lien at 
issue. Stated another way, wrhen assessing which party is the "successful 
party" under the mechanic's lien statute, a court should confine itself to 
consideration of only those claims relating directly to both the particular 
property on which the mechanic's lien action is asserted and the particular 
work on which the mechanic's lien action is based, (emphasis added) 
Id. at 275. 
From a common sense perspective, the lien claims are separate and distinct from 
9 
the delay damage claims, and provide different remedies. Logically, delay damages have 
no direct relation to a mechanic's lien. Pursuant to Utah law, an appropriate mechanic's 
lien is solely based on the value of the service rendered, labor performed, or materials or 
equipment furnished or rented. Hence, if a contractor paints a room and thereby 
increases the value of property by $1,000.00, the owner of that property has received 
$1,000.00 in value, notwithstanding the fact that the room may not have been painted 
within the timeframe expected by the parties. The property owner may have been 
damaged by a delay and entitled to recover an appropriate amount for the delay, but the 
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delay in and of itself does not change the fact that the property owner did receive an 
enhancement in value to his property of $1,000.00, which would be the correct 
mechanic's lien amount. 
Applying this reasoning to this case, even if the Smedsruds had paid Pochynok in 
full for work completed on the project, the Smedsruds would have still been entitled to 
sue Pochynok for any purported delay damages that were incurred in connection with the 
project. If the Smedsruds were successful in the suit, however, it is unlikely (barring a 
contractual provision) that the Smedsruds would receive their costs and fees as part of 
their recovery. Notably, costs and fees are what is presently at issue in this matter. 
In other words, the Smedsruds could be "successful" on a work delay claim 
regardless of whether a mechanic's lien claim existed or not. The point being, if 
Pochynok Company established its lien claim for a certain amount, the fact that delay 
damages are established by the Smedsruds should not negate the fact that Pochynok did 
in fact establish the viability of its lien claim and its entitlement to statutory attorney fees 
for establishing its claim. As such, it would be inappropriate for a court to simply net the 
figures of a successful lien claim and a successful delay claim (two separate and distinct 
claims), and then determine that a party was or was not successful for purposes of an 
attorney fees award pursuant to the mechanic's lien statute based upon that net figure. 
The trial court has also overlooked the fact that Pochynok was successful at trial 
(as it received an award), but has not taken this into account in awarding costs and fees. 
In effect, the trial court has granted the Smedsruds a clean win, granting all of their costs 
and fees in spite the successes Pochynok did have at trial. 
1C 
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This difficulty in this case is obvious. There is no way to know how the jury 
reached its conclusions. The parties and the courts can offer theories and rank 
speculation on the matter, but there is no way to know. Without information from the 
jury, the Supreme Court's mandated flexible and reasoned approach cannot properly be 
applied in this case. The balancing camiot occur and there cannot be an appropriate 
determination of awards and offsets. As such, for justice to occur, there must be a new 
trial in this case. Pochynok should also be awarded its costs and attorney fees in 
prosecuting this appeal pursuant to § 38-1-18. 
ISSUE 2 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO SET ASIDE THE 
GARNISHMENT OF POCHYNOK5 S ACCOUNT AND FAILED TO RESINSTATE 
POCHYNOK5S MECHANIC'S LIEN? 
The trial court erred when it failed to return the garnished funds to Pochynok and 
reinstate it mechanic's lien following the Supreme Court's decision. The Utah Supreme 
Court's decision caused the initial award of attorney's fees herein to be set aside. As 
such, any and all amounts the Smedsruds obtained from the garnishment proceeding 
founded on the trial court's award of attorney fees to the Smedsruds should have been 
returned to Pochynok. This is so because after the attorney fee award was vacated, there 
was no judgment amount which supported the Smedsmds retention of the garnished 
funds. Additionally, Pochynok5s mechanic's lien on the Smedsruds' property should have 
been reinstated. 
While there do not appear to be any Utah decisions that relate directly to the issues 
surrounding the return of garnished funds, other jurisdictions have evaluated similar 
10 
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situations. For example, in Baca v. Hoover, Bax, & Shearer, 823 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. 
App.-Houston [14th Dist] 1992, writ denied), the court indicated that the validity of a 
judgment in a garnishment action rests upon the finality of the underlying debt. The 
court continued, "If the judgment in the main suit is reversed, the garnishment 
proceedings become a nullity and the writs issued thereunder are functus officio, or of no 
further force or authority." The Texas court then determined that because the summary 
judgment had been reversed in that case, the garnishment proceeding became a nullity. 
The Texas court concluded that the garnishees were entitled to restitution of the funds 
that had been garnished from them. 
Similar to the situation in Baca, in this case, the Utah Supreme Court has set aside 
the award of attorney's fees, which entitled the Smedsmds to garnish funds from 
Pochynok's account. As such, there was no legal basis for the Smedsmds to retain the 
funds that were garnished until the time the trial court had entered its ruling. 
Consequently, those funds should have been returned to Pochynok. 
Additionally, the only net award remaining after the Supreme Court' and prior to 
the trial court's revised ruling was in Pochynok's favor. As such, Pochynok's 
mechanic's lien against the Smedsmds' property should have been reinstated as well. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Pochynok respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the ruling of the trial court that the Smedsmds were the successful party herein on the 
basis that the trial court did not have enough information to make a proper determination 
of awards and offsets. Moreover, Pochynok respectfully requests that this Court 
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determine the trial court's failure to reinstate Pochynok's mechanic's lien and return 
Pochynok's garnished funds was in error. Finally, Pochynok requests an award of its 
costs and fees associated with this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / 2 day of June, 2006. 
Ray GrfMartineau 
Anthony R. Martineaif 
Brett D. Cragun 
Attorneys For Plaintiff/Appellant 
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STATE OF UTAH 
J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, INC., a 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Counterclaim 
Defendant, 
vs. 
GREGORY SMEDSRUD; LOUANN 
SMEDSRUD; BUTTERFTELD LUMBER, 
INC., a Corporation; PELLA PRODUCTS, 
INC., a Corporation; BLAZE WHARTON 
CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Corporation; 
DIXIE WOODWORKS, INC., a Corporation; 
and JEFREY KAISER, doing business as RIO 
. GRANDE PAINTING, 
Defendants and Counterclaim 
Plaintiffs. 
SMEDSRUDS' PROPOSED FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW RE COSTS AND ATTORNEYS 
FEES 
Civil No. 020901328 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendants Gregory Smedsrud and Louann Smedsrud by counsel and pursuant to this 
Court's order of February 6, 2006, submits the following proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law re costs and attorneys fees in the above-entitled action. 
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MCDONOUGH 
Vincent C. Rampton 
Ross I. Romero 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Counterclaim Plaintiffs Gregory 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
SMEDSRUDS' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE 
COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES was mailed via first class mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following this )^1 j ^ d a y of February, 2006: 
Ray G. Martineau 
Anthony R. Martineau 
Brett D. Cragun /j 
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450 / 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 / / 
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Ross I. Romero (USB #7771) 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC 
Attorneys for Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud 
170 South Main Street, Suite #1500 
Post Office Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
Telephone: (801)521-3200 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. POCHYNOK COMPANY, INC., a 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GREGORY SMEDSRUD; LOUANN 
SMEDSRUD; BUTTERFIELD LUMBER, 
INC.; PELLA PRODUCTS, INC., a 
corporation; BLAZE WHARTON 
CONSTRUCTION, PNC, a corporation; DLXTE 
WOODWORKS, INC., a corporation; and 
JEFREY KAISER, dba RIO GRANDE 
PAINTING, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACTS AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE COSTS 
AND ATTORNEYS FEES 
Civil No. 020901328 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Pursuant to directive of the Utah Supreme Court by Opinion dated June 24, 2005, the Court 
enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law with respect to its award of costs and 
attorneys fees to Defendants Gregory Smedsrud and LouAnn Smedsrud ("Smedsruds") in the above-
entitled matter: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. This matter was tried to a jury on May 21 and 22, 2002. 
2. J. Pochynok Company Inc. ("Plaintiff') had filed a complaint against Gregory Smedsrud 
and Lou Ann Smedsrud ("Smedsruds") to foreclose a mechanic's lien asserted for work allegedly 
performed to the Smedsruds' residence located at 7100 Canyon Road in Summit County, State of Utah. 
3. Plaintiffs claims were based upon a Notice of Mechanic's Lien filed with the Summit 
County Recorder's office on October 19, 1999, in the amount of $74,360.51, together with interest, $100 
in costs and attorneys' fees. See Exhibit 1 hereto. 
4. Plaintiff had previously filed, and then released, a Notice of Mechanic's Lien against 
Defendants' property on July 26, 1999 in the amount of $150,000, plus interest, costs and attorneys' 
fees. See Exhibit 2. 
5. Plaintiff also brought claims against the Smedsruds for breach of contract and quantum 
meruit. 
6. The Smedsruds counterclaimed, asserting defective workmanship and failure to complete 
the project. 
7. Pella Products, Inc. had asserted a crossclaim against Smedsrud; this, however, had been 
dismissed with prejudice pursuant to stipulation and prior order of this Court. 
8. hi addition, all claims of Plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc. against Defendants Blaze 
Wharton Construction, Inc. and Jeffrey Kaiser were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 
Rule 41(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure prior to trial. 
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9. At trial, Plaintiff asserted a claim against Defendants in the amount of $81,269.9.1 
(exclusive of costs and attorneys'fees). 
10. Plaintiff offered inconsistent calculations, however, for money allegedly owed in the 
computation of its claim. Specifically, documentary evidence was introduced at trial showing 
inconsistent demands by Plaintiff for payment. : 
11. In addition, evidence was introduced that Plaintiff had filed the July 26, 1999 notice of 
mechanics' lien against Smedsruds' residence at a time when significant draw requests had recently been 
paid. 
12. Smedsruds presented evidence challenging Plaintiffs accounting work, and establishing 
that Plaintiffs claim at trial, and its second notice of mechanics' lien, were excessive. 
13. Smedsruds also presented evidence that they were entitled to significant offsets for 
unearned supervisor fees, work defects and delays. Specifically, Smedsruds presented evidence that 
a. Paint work had been double charged, resulting in overcharge of $23,087.07; 
b. Plaintiffs contractor fee on the paint work overcharged was likewise unwarranted, 
resulting in an overcharge of $2,308.71; 
c. Smedsruds had been subjected to unwarranted delay costs of $3,118.75; and 
d. Plaintiffs lien had been overstated, permitting offset in an amount equal to twice the 
overcharge amount, which Smedsruds placed at $11,535.96. 
14. Smedsruds further produced evidence that they had never received a consistent 
accounting from Plaintiff despite nearly tliree years of negotiations and attempts, contradictory and 
inconsistent claims coming from Plaintiff right up to the eve of trial. Had Plaintiff been willing to 
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discuss a consistent claim in light of Defendants' demands and offsets, the case would not have gone to 
trial; absent a cogent accounting, though, Defendants had no choice but to submit the matter for a jury to 
decide 
15. At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury returned a general verdict in favor of Plaintiff 
in the amount of only $7,076.56. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. With respect to an award of costs and attorneys fees to the "successful party" in this 
action, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1), this Court is charged with applying a "flexible and 
reasoned approach" to the parties' relative successes in establishing their claims at trial -AK&R Whipple 
Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Construction, 2004 Utah 47, fflf 25-26, 94 P.3d 270. 
2. At trial, Plaintiff asserted claims exceeding $81,000; Smedsruds, however (1) challenged 
the propriety of Plaintiff s accounting and claim, and (2) asserted an offset claim of $40,050.49, together 
with accrued judgment interest. 
3. As such, Plaintiff recovered on only a small fraction of its original claim, which was 
reduced by a factor even greater than the dollar amount of Smedsruds' claimed offsets. 
4. The trial court found Smedsruds' challenge to Plaintiffs claim, coupled with their 
asserted offsets, more persuasive than Plaintiffs offered evidence in support of its claim. 
5. The trial court was further persuaded that, had Plaintiff offered an accurate accounting to 
Smedsruds, trial by jury might have been averted. 
6. Under these circumstances, the court concludes that Smedsruds obtained a comparative 
victory, considering what total victory would have meant for each of the parties. 
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7. The court further concludes that Smedsruds obtained a full percentage of their claimed 
offsets. 
8f Accordingly, the court concludes that Smedsruds were the "successful party" at trial, for 
purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1). 
9. hi light of the foregoing, the court affirms its prior award of costs and attorneys fees to 
Smedsruds, and its prior denial of costs and attomeys fees to Plaintiff. 
10. In light of the foregoing, the court likewise reaffirms its award of Smedsruds' costs and 
attorneys fees incurred after May 9, 2002, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(3), given that 
Smedsruds' May 9, 2002 Offer of Judgment was greater than Plaintiffs actual recovery at trial, with or 
without an award of costs and attorneys fees under Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1). 
11. The court therefore reaffirms its judgment upon verdict and order on post-trial motions 
entered August 15, 2002, as that order and judgment may hereafter be supplemented in the amount of 
any post-judgment costs and attorneys fees incurred by Smedsruds as may hereafter be established by 
affidavit. 
DATED this day of March, 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
J. Dennis Frederick, District Judge 
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MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 020901328 
Hon. J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
March 3, 2 00 6 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
the Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Costs 
and Attorneys Fees, submitted by the parties in accordance with 
this Court's February 6, 2 006 Minute Entry and in response to the 
Utah Supreme Court's concern regarding the need to enter 
additional findings to support this Court's prior award of 
attorney fees. 
The Court having reviewed the respective submissions finds 
those submitted by Defendants Gregory and Louann Smedsrud 
accurately reflect the persuasive and credible evidence adduced 
at trial. Accordingly, the Court will enter the same as the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Costs and Attorneys 
Fees . 
DATED this J^day of March, 2 006. A 
E(CE0¥1£ 
I MAR - 6 2006 
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J . D 
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